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CURRENCY EQUIVALENT
US$ 1 = W 790 (February 1993)
US$ 0.001 = W I
US$ 1 million = W 790 million
US$ 1336.0 = W 1 million
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
WEIGHTS AND EX.SURES
1 meter (m) = 3 2808 feet (ft)
1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi)
1 square kilometer (km2)= 0.386X. square miles (sq.mi)
1 hectare (ha) = 0.01 km2 = 2.4711 acres (ac)
1 metric ton (m ton) - 2.2046226 pounds (lbs)
= 1.1023 short tons (sh tons or 2000 lbs)
- 0.9842 long tons (lg tons or 2240 lbs)
PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS JND ACRONYMS
CBD - Central Business L..strict
EIRR - Economic Internal Rate of Return
GNP - Gross National Product
ICB - International Competitive Bidding
KHB - Korea Housing Bank
KLDC - Korea Land Development Corporation
KNHC - Korea National Housing Corporation
KNR - Korean National Railroad
LCB - Local Competitive Bidding
NHF - National Housing Fund
SMG - Seoul Metropolitan Government
TPD - Traffic Police Department
TSM - Transport System Management
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SUBJEOT: Project Completion Report on Rorea
Attached is the "Project Completion Report on torea - Seoul Urban
Transportatifn Project (Loan 2514-1O)," Jointly prepared by the Infrastructure
1)vision of the Asia Technical Department and the Infrastructure Operations
Division of the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office and the Borrower.
The project achieved its objectives concetning the construction of urban
transport infrastructure and the introduction of Transport System Management
(TSM) techniques. Although the project was successfully completed, it had to be
re-shaped in order to acdommodate traffic decrease along specific orridors and
protests from commuities that needed to be resettled. The project demonstrates
that institution building in urban transport is a slow process-and requiras
training and new management echniques. It also shows the need to integrate
prevention against the negative social impacts of land acquisition in project
design and preparation. These lessons are valuable in the context of Korea's
growing needs for urban transport management.
On balance, the project vutcome is rated assstisfactory, its institutional
development impact as partial (due to its limited impact on broader sectoral
objectives), and the sustainability of its policy approach as uncertain due to
the persistent lags between urban transport improvements and continued inareases
in traffic.
The PCR is of good quality with the exception of the economic rate of
return analysis which lacks substantiation. No audit is planned.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROJECT
(Loan 2514-KO)
PREFACE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the
Seoul Urban Transportation Project in Korea, for which Loan
2514-KO, in the amount of US$ 53.0 million equivalent was
approved on May 17, 1985. The loan was extended from June 30,
1990 to June 30, 1992, and final disbursement was made on
December 14, 1992, which refers to the recovery of the special
account. Disbursements under the loan totaled US$ 24,601,084.68
million, with final disbursement made on July 30, 1991. USS 24.4
million were canceled effective January 23, 1987.
US$ 4,155,915.32, cost savings and undisbursed balance, was
canceled effective January 5, 1993 when the loan account was
closed.
The PCR was jointly prepared by the Infrastructure
Division of the Asia Technical Department (ASTIN), the
Infrastructure Operations Division (EAlIN) of the East Asia and
Pacific Regional Office and the Borrower, and is based, inter
alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the Loan Agreement,
supervision reports, the Borrowers own records, correspondence
between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda.
PnOJUO COXMPI.MTON RUPORT
KORUA
INOIUL !D)NUTRNPORThTION VR OPOT
(Loan 2514-10)
UThLUJTITON 5uca
The in projoct objectives include the consrution
of urban transport infrastructure as well as the introduction of
Transport System Management (TSM) techniques along selected
transport corridors and in the Central Business District (CBD)
of Seoul Special City. In addition, the project aims to preserve
and strengthen public transport and promote institutional
development, specifically of the Seoul Metropolitan Government(SMG) and the Traffic Police Department (TPD).
Due to a number of factors including traffic decrease
along specific corridors, assistance from developers to finance
roadworks and vociferous protests from individuals faced with
resettlement, the project was amended and certain elements
downsized in 1987 (major roadworks and interchange investments).
However, the re-shaped project was successfully completed with
the TSM component expanded, beyond the project scope, to other
areas in Seoul and indeed other cities in Korea.
With dramatic and continued increases in traffic in
Seoul, the civil works components are expecte4 to yield benefits
in excess of original estimates. However, although the TSM
concept has been well received and is dupli.-ated in many other
areas, the beneficial impact, although significant after
implementation,, has in many cases been shorter lived than
originally expected due to the continued and constant increases
in traffic volumes.
The main findings and lessons learned from the Seoul
Vrban Transportation Project include the followlng:
(a) The concept of TSX has been successfully introduged
into Korea. Although it remains in its infancy due to
limited professional expertise and the ;eiidency for
public agencies to emphasize capital invesSment, there
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is a growing appreciation of the positive impact of
TSM strategies.
(b) Institution building in uroan transport is a slow and
on-going exercise involving many elements which
includes training, the purchase of new equipment, the
introduction of new management techniques and
organizational restructuring, in order to realize full
potential benefits. With recognition of the
importance of management and policy reforms, Korean
cities are becoming poised for a new era of urban
transport management.
(c) Environmental issues, in particular community
disruption resulting from land acquisition, was mucih
underrated by the govarnment and did in fact directly
impact the construction of a number of components. In
the future more care will need to be taken in judging
the impact of resettlement, and arrangements for land
acquisitior. begun far in advance of project work so
that construction schedules are not unduly disrupted.
(d) There is a preference to use domestic resources for
project components when domestic funds are available.
The Bank's8 comparative advantage lies in the
introduction of new and innovative ideas. This was
apparent with government support of the TSM component,
and withdrawal of a number of the civil works
components.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
SEOUL URBAN TRASPORTATION PROJECT
(Loan 2514-O)
PART I: 8ANK'S REVIEW
1. Summary Project Data
Project Name : Seoul Urban Transportation Project
Loan Number : 2514-KO
RVP Unit : East Asia Loan Amount : US$ 53.OM
Country : Korea Canneled Amount : US$ 28.4M
Sector : Transport Disbursed Amount : US$ 24.6M
Subsector : Urban Transport
Approval Date : 5/17/85 Staff Appraisal: July 1984
Effective Date : 7/5/85 Number of Extensions: Two
original Closing Date : 6/30/90
Amended Ciosing Date: 6/30/92 Total Project Cost: US$127.4M
Appraisal ERR : 41% Re-assessed ERR : 35%
2. Background and Sectoral Information
2.1 In 1984, when the Seoul Urban Transportation Project
was appraised, the population of Korea was 40 million. GNP
growth had averaged at about 10% annually throughout the decade
and 8.5% since 1964. Two decades of rapid economic growth had
brought Korean per capita income to US$ 2000 by mid-1984. This,
coupled with the changing structure of the economy resulted in
a population shift from rural to urban, with over 60% of Koreans
living in urban areas. While overall population growth in the
1980s declined to under 1.5% per annum, urban population
continued to increase at more than 5% annually. A number of
large cities emerged, with Seoul being by far the largest in the
country at about 9 million inhabitants.
2.2 In 1991, Korea was still expanding and growing
economically. The remainder of the 1980s saw a continuing GNP
growth of about 10% annually. Overall population growth,
estimated at 43 million in 1991, had declined to about 1.0% per
year. Urban growth, although slowing, still registered an annual
increase of 3%, and income levels had risen Iramatically to US$
5400. With increased prosperity came a slow but rapidly rising
growth in the number of privately owned automobiles. Between
1983-1988 there was a 24% annual growth nationally, and a 35%
growth in Seoul and its immediately surrounding area (the
Kyonggi Region). In 1991 alone there were about 540 new cars
registered per day in Seoul, accounting for over one-fourth of
the national average (2100 per day). Although car registration
in Seoul decreased to 14% between 1991 and 1992, it has remained
very high both nationally (25%) and regionally (35%). Associated
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with this growth in automobiles had also come a significant rise
in traffic accidents. In 1982 over 6000 persons were killed on
the roads and another 130,000 injur3d, giving Korea the dubious
distinction of having the third highest rate of deaths per 1000
vehicles among 36 developing countries. The estimated cost to
the Korean economy amounted to over 1% of annual GNP.
2.3 During the 19709 and 1980s Korea's rapid economic
growth, coupled with increased level s of disposable income,
which spawned a higher number of trips, trained the transport
system. Massive public sector investments in transport
infrastructure were made to support this growth. with the
government continuing to allocate a sizable proportion of its
total capital expenditure to expand and modernize transport
infrastructure (about 15% annually during the years 1982-1991).
The basic objective of government intervention in transport in
the 1980s was to increase and modernize the capaci%y of the
transport system nationally, to accommodate projected traffic
growth and avoid major bottlenecks. This was coupled with the
objective to encourage development of new industrial areas and
housing~ complexes outside of the Seoul city center.
2.4 In the years immediately preceding the Bank project
(1966-1984), substantial changes had occurred in the modal
distribution of traffic. Transport by road had become
predominant, with road capturing 40% of the freight traffic
(rail 31%; coastal shipping 29%-), and 73% of the passenger
traffic (rail 25%).
Appraisal Context: Seoul
2.5 As of December 1991, 24.5% of the total national
population of 43 million people, lived in Seoul, which only
occupies .61% of the entire territory of the country. Per capita
income in the city had increased from US$2,600 in 1985 to almost
US$ 6,500 by 1991. The increased income levels coupled with the
city's dense population naturally led to housing shortages and
traffic congestion. Problems were augmented by: a population and
functional concentration of activity in the city center; roads
historically radially structured towards the CBD; narrow
streets; increased number of vehicles; and a significant
increase in travel population. The results culminated in a 42%
increase in traffic accidents between 1983 and 1988. In the
period between 1983 and 1988 the number of person-trips had
risen from 15 million to 18.5 million. By 1991 it had risen to
25.1 million. Although the share of car passenger traffic had
doubled since the early 1980s, in 1991 it remained at a modest
14% of total passenger trips, with buses contin-iing to dominate
transport in the city at 41% (declining from a high of 64% in
1983). Travel by subways and the railroad increased from 9% to
17% in the same time period (para.2.8).
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Appraisal Context: Kyonggl Region
2.6 Seoul's growth has been at the center of the debate on
spatial development strategy. Various actions have been taken to
restrict and re-direct its growth including the est&a,1ishment of
a greenbelt in the 1970s, strict land-use planning, and the
division of the capital region into a spectrum of zones ranging
from dispersal to promotional. These efforts have spread the
city continuously southward. Today, the areas open for expansion
lie in the far south of Kyonggi Province at distances between
30-50 km from the city.
2.7 The Kyonggi Region, located in the northwestern part
of the country, includes three provincial-level administrative
units including Seoul city, Inchon City (the country's seconid
largest seaport with a population of 2 million in 1991), and
Kyonggi-Do Province (which encircles Seoul and Inchon and
includes the two busiest transport ccrridors, namely the Seoul-
Inchon Corridor and the Seoul-Pyongtaek section of the Seoul-
Pusan Corridor). Kyonggi Region is also highly industrialized,
consistently generating about 40% of the national GNP with Seoul
alone accounting for about 70%. The concentration of population
and economic activity in the Region has resulted in an explosive
demand for transport infrastructure and services.
The Transport System
2.8 Transport in Seoul is composed of both road and rail.
The emphasis of the road construction program in the 1980s was
towards circumferential road projects and the improvement of
cross-city links along the northern and southern banks of the
Han River. The major short-term focus was to eliminate
bottlenecks, build and improve major arterials of regional
importance, and provide access to the eastern portion of the
south bank for the 1988 Olympics and the many new apartment
complexes which were being built. Although the 19805 saw a
significant increase in private vehicles, Seoul residents
remained major users of the public transport system (para.2.5).
In 1983, of the estimated 15 million daily trips by mechanical
modes, about 64% were by bus, 17% by taxis, 9% by car and others
and 10% by rail/subway. In 1988 of the 18.5 million daily
trips, 51% were taken by bus, 16% by taxis, 17% car and others
and 17% by rail/subway. The subway system expanded
significantly over the last decade from 22.1 kms in 1980 to 118
kms in 1991. In 1982 one of the major concerns of the
government was to integrate the public transport facilities of
bus and rail transit as fully as possible, and avoid severe
congestion in the CBD.
2.9 Between 1982 and 1991, Seoul and its Region has grown
dramatically, both in population and economic activity. The
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result has been a continued strain on the transport network,
with travel time in the CBD decreasing from 30.8 km/hr in 1980
to 18.6 km/hr in 1989, and 17.6 km/hr in 1991. However, in 1992,
the trend appears to have been somewhat reversed with the
average speed increasing to 19.3 km/hr. This is attributed to
the limitations placed on car entry into the CBD (February
1992). Despite the construction of satellite cities (including
Bundang, Ilsan, Kwacheon and Sang-gae with a total projected
population of over 1 million), and improvement of access roads,
these routes are heavily used and unable to keep up with demand.
About 35% of the passenger traffic in the region either
originates or is destined for Seoul. The situation is similar
for freight traffic, where a high proportion moves not only
across Seoul's boundaries but also circumferentially outride the
city. To accommodate this traffic there are presently two ring-
roads within Seoul, with a third under construction (completion
expected by 2001).
Transport Planning
2.10 Housing, water supply and sewerage, urban transport
and general infrastructure were the primary focus of the
Government's urban development strategy throughout the 1980s,
with housing and transport among the top priorities. To deal
with rapid growth in Seoul and the Kyonggi Region, two specific
regional development plans were prepared in the early 1980's and
have both been updated to bring the Region into the 21st
century. The first, referred to as the Comprehensive Physical
National Development Plan, has focused on relieving congestion
in and around Seoul by introducing appropriate traffic
management. The second plan, sometimes referred to as the Seoul
Growth Management Plan, has focused on facilitating economic
development with its prime emphasis on the construction of
satellite cities (para.2.9), and improvements in expressways,
rail lines and highways in and around Seoul, mainly to relieve
population density and traffic congestion in the city.
3. Previous Bank Involvement
3.1 Since 1979, the Bank has made eight loans in support
of urban development projects, two land development and low-
income housing projects, three regional development projects and
three water supply projects. All were designed to support
significant policy and institutional changes. The Bank focus in
the urban sector in Korea has been housing. Initially, the Bank
concentrated on tl.e introduction of new approaches to the
provision of low-income housing to its individual clients, the
Korea Housing Bank (KHC) , the National Housing Fund (NHF), the
Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) and the Korea National
Housing Corporation (KNHC). Subsequently the Bank strategy has
been elevated to encompass sector-wide concerns and policies
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which link the performance of tha housing sector to the rest of
the economy, with Bank support for urban development coinciding
closely with the Government's emphasis on urbanization,
industria3 Aesveloprent and energy conservation.
3.2 In other areas of infrastructure investment, the Bank
has been significantly involved in the highway subsector, having
approved loans for six highway projects totaling USS 690
million. One of these loans, the Kyonggi Regional Transport
Project specifically focused on elimination of bottlenecks in
and around Seoul by financing portions of Seoul's third ring
road (the Pangyo-Kuri and Shingal-Ansan sections), encouraging
coordinated transport planning in the region, and supporting a
traffic management study in specific urban areas around Seoul.
Similarly, a number of projects in the rail subsector also
touched on teansport issues related to Seoul, specifically the
Fourth and Fifth Railway Projects (Loans 863-X0 and 1101-K0),
which included completion of the electrification program for
lines connecting Sedul with the North-Eastern part of Korea, as
well as those KNR lines in the Seoul suburban areas.
4. EgUgW_-on-InitiatJves
4.1 The Pusan Urban transport management Project is only
project presently planned by the Bank in the urban transport
stubsector. In 5eptember 1991 a Bank mission did appraise a
Railroad Systems Modernization Project which had as its main
component support of the expansion of the Seoul suburban
passenger service. However, due to Bank's concern regaiding
restructuring of the railroad, the project has been indefinitely
postponed.
5. %be-299tAct
Objectives
5.1 The main objectives of the project include not only
the construction of urban transport infrastructure but also the
promotion of more capable and better coordinated urban transport
institutions. Specifically the objectives include:
(a) improvement of the transportation system in Seoul
through a comprehensive set of investments and
programs such as: (i) improvements to major
intersections; (ii) the construction and widening of
strategic road links; and (iii) the introduction and
application of Transport System Management (TSM)
techniques along selected transport corridors and in
the CBD;
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(b) preservation and sitroethening of the public transport
system by: (i) introducing bus priority Aeasures; and
(ii) promoting the integration of the bus and subway
systems; and
(c) promotion of institutional development by
strengthening the capabilities of the Seoul
Metropolitan Govesnment (SMG) and the Traffic Police
Department (TPD) to plan,, implement and evaluate
traffic and safety improvements.
Descrlption
5.2 The project in%cluded the following four principal
components:
1. Major Road Investments on three main routes:
(a) construction of a missing link in the Western Arterial from
Sihung to the Kyong-In Expressway to form an effective western
distributor and bypass to the CBD (10.84 Kms); (b) widening and
upgrading of the Eastern Arterial between Euijeongbu in the
northeast and Seongnam in the southeast (8.7 kms) to provide
improved access and CBD bypass; and (c) upgrade of the existing
North Han River Road between the Hannam and Jamsil Bridges (8.4
kIs).
2. Major Intersection Improvements including;
(a) the construction of a grade-separated interchange between
the Eastern Arterial and the North Han Riverside Road at the
Yeong Dong Interchange; (b) conversion of an existing rotary
into a fully grade-separated interchange at Yeongdeungpo; and
(c) rebuilding of the Gilum -nterchange to facilitate traffic
movements westward onto the Ring Road.
3. TSM and Safety Programs: composed of a four-year
program of TSM measures along about 17 major traffic corridors
and in the CBD, including junction improvements, one-way
streets, channelization, markings, signaling, bus bays and
priority lanes, selective road widening, and the introduction of
pedestrian facilities such as safety islands and controlled
crossings. In addition there is also a city wide remedial
program of accident prevention which includes the introduction
of safety measures at about 200-300 hazardous locations through
investments recommended by the accident investigation and
analysis system to be introduced as part of the institutional
development A. Traffic Police Department (TPD).
4. Institutional Development: to support technical
assistance, training, studies and a limited amount of equipment
to. improve both the content and process of urban transport
administration in Seoul City. The focus included two main
agencies, SNG and the Seoul TPD.
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Deslgn and Organization
5.3 At the time of appraisal it was determined that Korean
agencies had become well experienced in general civil works but
remained weak in planning and coordinating a system of
investments. Therefore the rationale for the project was to
promote institutional development in order to strengthen
planning capability and to introduce traffic management concepts
and practices. The Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) became
the executing agency for the project. The Project Management and
Evaluation Bureau of SMG had the overall responsibility of
overseeing the project,, vxith the Transportation and Construction
Management Bureaus as well as the Office of Construction and
Engineering, and the Traffic Police Department directly involved
in Its implementation. The Construction Bureau together with the
Office of Construction and Engineering were responsible for the
major road investments and intersection improvements with the
construction Bureau also involved in the design of the major
works in the TSM Program. The Transportation Bureau retained
virtual total responsibility for the TSM Program and shared
responsibility for the implementation of the Safety Program,
with the Traffic Police Department. Project. implementation began
in 1985 and was completed in 1991. At the time of appraisal, it
was intended that project implementation wopld take foir years,
instead it took seven.
Revisions a.32 Amendments
5.4 In 1987 adjustments were made to the Bank loan due to
the cancellation of a ninber of project components including;
the upgrading of the North Han Riverside Road; the Nowon-Gongdae
Road; the Yeong Dong Interchange; and the Gilum Interchange.
Work on the Gilkm Interchange was scaled down and a smaller
version of the component shifted for inclusion in the TSX
Program. A.new road, the Seongsan,Dong-Jungsan Dong route was
included-in the project as a substitute. In addition six more
corridors and 2 areas (including Gilum and Yeongdeungpo) were
added to the TSM component. A total of US$ 24e23 million was
canceled.
5.5 In 1990 an adjustment was made to the TSP Program. Due
to exchange rate savings, a total of US$ 5.19 million was
transferied from the TSM to the Seongsan. Dong-rungsan Dong Road
component of the Bank project to f inance a shortfall in civil
works. In January 1993, with the completion of the project, an
additional US$ 4.2 million was canceled.
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Physical Works
6.1 MAiqr Road l Invoe1e . As noted in para .5.4 above,
there were some major changes made to the project in 1987, which
resulted in the cancellation of two of the road components. The
first, the North Han Riverside Road, whose objective was to
upgrade a portion of the existing route and thus relieve some of
the congestion on the road, was canceled due to a decrease in
traffic. The reason !or this is that with the completion of the
Olympic Expressway (1982-1988), much of the traffic which had
been using the North Han Riverside Road dispersed. In response
to this occurrence, the government lowered its priority for
upgrading this route and postponed work to a future date. The
second road canceled was the Nowon-Gongdae Road component. The
reason for this cancellation was that sufficient domestic funds
had been mobilized which enabled the government to carry out the
project locally. The construction of a new housing development
at Sang-gae (1986-90 for about 150,000 people), adjacent to the
project route, allowed the Korea Housing corporation (KHC),
which oversaw the development and collected the developer's
contributicn to infrastructure upgrading in the area, to collect
sufficient c.a.pital to upgrade the Nowon-Gongdae Road without the
use of Bank funds. The construction of the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan
Dong portion of the western arterial road was substituted for
the above two cancellations. With its construction, much of the
traffic which was forced to travel through the CBD to move from
one end of the western arterial to the other, could now bypass
the city center.
6.2 Mair IXIterseaion ImDroaements. Two of the major
interchange improvements appraised under this project were also
canceled. The first, cancellation of the construction of a grade
separated interchange at Yeongdeungpo, was in part due to
concerns that construction was not timely as it would occur
during the Olympic Games of 1988, causing unnecessary congestion
and disruption of traffic in areas affected by the games'
activities. It was instead included in the TSM Program as a
temporary solution. The other cancellation was the Gilus
Interchange. The main reason for its cancellation concerns
difficulties encountered with land acquisition and resettlement.
ocal residents simply opposed the project to such an extent
that it was dropped.
6.3 ransoZt M aag. t O adwSafetA.Pr=o=6
Implementation of both of these compohents was achieved without
issue. All sub-components were successfully completed. As noted
in paras.5.4 and 5.5 there were a number of additions made to
the TSM component in 1987. Also because there were some exchange
rate savings in this program US$ 5.19 million was transferred
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from Tam to the civil works component in order to facilitate the
completion of the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan Dong Road.
6.4 Two TSM monitoring studies have been completed during
project implementation. These included a before and after
analysis on both the TSM and safety components. The first study
(Seoul City Public Transport System Improvement Study), which
was prepared by the Korea Institute of Transport Studies,
included 12 of the TSM corridors and was completed in July of
1989. Four of the remaining corridors were monitored and
analyzed by the Traffic Management Institute of SMG (established
in 1989). This study was completed in 1991.
Procurement
6.4 Procurement experience under this project concerned:
(a) Civil Works. Due to the down scoping of the entire
project, noted in para.5.4 above, the number of
contracts for major civil works declined from the
appraisal estimate of about ten to five. The five
resultant contracts totaling about 40 billion Won were
tendered and awarded in conformance with the Bank's
Guidelines on International Competitive Bidding (ICB)
and were financed under the Bank Loan. The smaller
civil works contracts dealing with the TSM and safety
improvements were implemented over the entire project
period on the basis of Local Competitive Bidding
(LCB), in accordance with procedures which were
acceptable to the Bank. The procedures and
documentation on procurement were handled properly by
SMG. Most works were satisfactorily completed with
some delays encountered in the construction of the new
road and western arterial, mainly caused by problems
of land acquisition and revisions in the design of the
new road alignment (construction of an underpass in
place of a viaduct).
(b) Consultina Services. Construction supervision of civil
works was carried out by SMG with the assistance of
local consultants fully financed by SMG. Three
consultants provided advice and review functions for
the major civil works. Similarly, for TSM and safety
improvement works, the Korea Advanced Institute of
Science & Technology and other local firms assisted
the SMG staff. The performance of both SMG and the
consultants in the supervision of the civil works was
satisfactory.
-10-
Disbursement
6.5 The disbursement rate, in general, was slow throughout
the project and stayed very low in the early stage of
implementation (1985-87), before the down scoping of the project
from the original loan amount of $53 to $28.8 million. Two
major civil works representing almost 20% of project cost, the
North Han Riverside Road and the Gilum Interchange, were
postponed but later substituted by the construction of a new
link for the western arterial road, the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan
Dong portion. Moreover, SMG became reluctant to draw upon loan
funds when domestic funds were available with actual bid amounts
lower than estimated costs. Following the cancellation of US$
24.2 million in January 1987, disbursement improved but remained
lower than expected because of delays and increase in land
acquisition and construction costs of the two major remaining
civil works components. The project was amended for the second
time in December 1990 in response to the request for
reallocation of funds between project components and extension
of project closing date. The project closing date was extended
twice and finally, was closed on June 30, 1992 with about $4.15
million loan amount left unutilized, which was canceled on
January 3, 1993.
6.6 Overall, disbursement represented 19.4% ($24.6
million) of total revised costs ($127.4 million). The
disbursement percentage for civil works as provided for in the
Loan Agreement was 40% of total costs of the civil works
financed by the Bank. The costs of consultancy services and
land acquisition were entirely defrayed by the Borrower.
7. Project Results and Lessons Learned
Project Results
7.1 The civil works component of the project was altered
extensively. This was due to a number of reasons including
decreased traffic levels (North Han Riverside Road), preference
to use domestic funds (Nowon-Gongdae Road), fears of potential
impact on traffic generated by the Olympic Games (Yeongdeungpo
Rotary), and problems with land acquisition and compensation
which resulted in component down scaling (Gilum Interchange).
Included in their stead was the construction of the Seongsan
Dong-Jungsan Dong Road. Completion of the remaining physical
targets including the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan Dong Road were,
however, met successfully. In the interim, it has become
apparent that those components withdrawn from the project have
been or will shortly need to be included in the government's own
investment program due to renewed urgency. For example, in the
case of the North Han Riverside Road, following the end of the
Olympic Games, traffic on the road increased to such an extent
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that its upgrading became a government priority. As a result
construction began in 1989 using domestic funds, with completion
planned for the end of 1993. A similar situation has arisen with
respect to both the Gilum and Yeor.gdeungpo Interchanges. In the
case of the former, the component was down scaled and included
in the TSM Program but with the magnitude of the traffic,
success was limited. Anticipating the need for future works the
city continued to purchase land for purposes of future
construction of the interchange as originally planned. Land
acquisition is now almost complete and the government expects to
begin construction in either 1994 or 1995. In the case of the
Yeongdeungpo Interchange, although it was also included in the
TSM Program, success was likewise minimal due to the magnitude
of the traffic increase. Although no detailed plans have yet
been prepared, the government has acknowledged the need for a
new facility and has begun to prepare plans for future
implementation.
7.2 The developmental objectives of the TSM program were
achieved beyond appraisal expectation. This was the Bank's first
urban transport project in Korea which emphasized the intro-
duction of TSMN The concept included a comprehensive approach to
enhancing the effectiveness of the existing road and public
transport network with a minimum of investment. Overall, this
component has been an overwhelming success even though the
impact of some TSM projects may have been short-lived due to
extremely rapid traffic growth. All physical targets have been
exceeded with even more implemented than originally planned. In
addition all safety improvement schemes have also been
implemented. Productivity improvements have been realized by
both bus operators and bus users with the opening of bus lanes
along major corridors. The two project implementing agencies,
SNG and TPD, have embraced the approaches of TSM and road safety
improvement as integral features of their transport sector
strategies. The TSM concept has also gradually spread from
Seoul to other large cities and over the years, expertise in
design and implementation of TSI schemes, particularly among
local consultants and central government institutions (e.g.,
Korea Transport Institute), has grown. The 1985 Urban
Transportation Act, which requires cities with populations over
300,000 population to develop short and long range transporta-
tion investment plans and traffic impact studies for major
developments, offers evidence of the Korean Government's
commitment to improved planning and coordination of urban
transport through the implementation of TSM practices. The
monitoring studies conducted indicate the extent of the impacts
of both the TSM and safety components, with visible improvements
seen in all seventeen of the corridors which include three
business areas and about 600 intersections. Although in many
cases full benefits have been short-lived due to rapid traffic
growth, the passenger carrying capacity of all project corridors
have increased.
-12-
7.3 However, due to the lack of experience of SMG in TSM,
and consequently their lack of confidence in making radical
proposals, there have been some design shortcomings in TSM
schemes implemented under the project. To some extent emphasis
has been on physical improvements of roads and intersections
(road signs and markings, channelization, installation of
signals, pedestrian walkways, bus lane marking and signE, etc.)
with limited integration of these improvements with operations
planning (integrated traffic circulation plan, parking
management, platoon type operations of bus in bus lanes, etc.),
tactical planning (bus priority schemes, enforcement of traffic
regulation, auto restraint policies, etc.) and strategic
planning (land use and transport relationships), the three
important components of any comprehensive TSM scheme. The
importanca of interagency linkages, a necessity for enhancing
efficient use of road space through TSM strategies, was also in
some cases either not fully understood or avoided to minimize
the hurdles of coordination and enforcement by various agencies
(such as police, private bus operators and various bureaus of
SMG).
7 .4 To support the implementation and continuity of these
practices the TSM section of the Transportation Planning
Division (under Transportation Bureau) and Traffic Division of
Police Administration in SMG have been strengthened through
training, technical assistance and purchase of equipment. The
notion of treating transportation in an integrated fashion
covering large continuous geographic area with a mix of
strategies has gradually replaced past practices of isolated
treatment of problems. In this respect the project has fully
served its key objective. Over time TSM practices would mature
in complexity and their importance further realized with
experience.
7.5 Nonetheless, considering the magnitude and complexity
of Seoul City's traffic problems, the existing TSM section needs
to be further strengthened to effectively manage, design and
monitor TSM and demand management programs. However, since the
SMG tends to contract out TSM related works to consultants, the
need for strengthening in-house capability is not fully
realized. Moreover, there is generally an acute shortage of
experienced transportation professionals particularly with TSM
knd transportation planning skills because individuals with this
kind of knowledge and expertise are difficult to retain. With
the recent approval of the Local Autonomy Act (1988), urban
district offices have gained significant independence in revenue
generation, administration, planning, and implementation of
projects. This has amplified the need for coordinated planning,
design, and continuous monitoring in the central office.
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Environment
7.6 The most pressing environmental issue confronting the
project concerned the acquisition of land and resettlembent of
affected residents. The project planners underestimated the
degree of public opposition to land acquisition. Although it
quickly became evident that land prices had risen, in most
instances residents were prepared to sell, given the appropriate
incentive. Delays occurred due to prolonged negotiations (from
I to 3 years) as opposed to the one year which was planned at
appraisal. In the case of the Gilum Interchange, the component
was dropped from the project because of the government's
inability to purchase all of the required land in a timely
fashion. In other situations court decisions respecting the
appropriate value of land lingered longer than anticipated. No
data on the extent of resettlement was available to determine
the magnitude of community disruption.
Economlc Analysis
7 .7 The project undoubtedly improved the transport and
traffic conditions in Seoul City. The various investments
included in the project were aimed at reducing traffic
congestion, improving speeds and reducing travel times. This has
to a large extent been achieved through street expansions and
widening. and the construction of important links. The benefits
quantified at appraisal remain justifiable. Although Vehicle
operating Costs (VOC) savings have not altered appreciably since
appraisal, income levels or the Korean population have increased
substantially. The time savings attributable to the project have
therefore also increased, with the resultant post-appraisal
EIRRs somewhat different from that projected by the appraisal
team. The re-calculated project EIRR is 35%. It was estimated at
41% during appraisal. The reason for the lower EIRR is due
mainly to the cancellation the North Ran River Side Road which
had a particularly high appraisal estimate (57%). The breakdown
of the rates of return are as follows:
Appraisal Post-Appraisal
EIRR EIRR
Nowon-Gondae 18% -
North Ran River Side Rd 57%
Suseo-Segok 30% 34%
Kyong-In-Sih2ng 31% 35%
Seongsan-Jungsan - 30%
Yeong Dong Interchange 47% 41%
Overall EIRR 41% 35t
a a Ce a C__O :D b_ D< O 00000Doe
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708 Although a comparative economic analysis for the
project, appraisal and post evaluation was prepared, it was
difficult. The reason is that even though the SAR did include.
some deLtails on the methodology used and basic assumptions made,
neither the appraisal report nor the project files offered
sufficient information for such an analysis. There were
significant gaps in data on traffic (actual and projected),
economic costs (annual and by major investment category), and
treatment of quantified economic benefits during the life of the
project, to conduct a thorough post evaluative analysis. In
addition, no record was available on the economic evaluation of
the Seoungsan--Jungsan Road component in project files.
FIydins a Lnd uLess -WAIne4
7.9 The following outlines the main findings and lessons
learned from the Bank's involvement in the Seoul Urban Transport
Project:
(a) The concept of TSM was successfully introduced in
Seoul. AlthoUgh it remains,in its infancy because of
limited professional expertise and the tendency of
public agencies to emphasize capital investment, there
is a growing appreciation of the positive impact of
TSM strategies. In fact a total of eight additional
areas in Seoul have already been selected for TSM
improvements.
(b) Institution building in thg urban transport sector is
a slow and on-going process. The benefits of
training, organizational restructuring, new equipment
and introduction of new tnagement practices need time
to catch hold. With the grifual growth in local
training opportynities and recognition of management
and policy reforms as important to emerging urban
transport issues, Korean cities are becoming poised
for a new era of urban transport management.
(c) At the state of projebt preparstion environmental
issues, in partic,;lar community disruption associated
with land acquisition, must be identified along with
a comprehensive mitigation plan. This is essential in
order to minimize the risks of project delays and cost
escalation. In fast growing urban areas such. as
Seoul, the potential of delays linked with ;and
acquisition is extkemely high due to rapid escalation
in land prices and coimunity opposition. land
acquisition needs to be initialed at the very early
stage of project timplemenitation ahd an appropriate
strategy for piblic participation developed.
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(d) Commitment by the goverhment is key to project
success, particularly in the case of innovative
concepts or policy reform. This has been true with
respeat to the introduction of TS! under this project.
(e) There is a preference to use domestic resources for
project components when domestic funds are available.
Of the three civil works components which were
canceled, all have been or-are in the process of being
reinstated with financing from local sources. The
Bank's comparative advantage in Korea lies mainly in
the introduction of those components with limited
expertise or knowledge internally, such as was the
case with the TSM component in the project.
8. SustainabilitylReaining-Issues
801 With traffic ever increasing, it is expected that the
major roadworks. and interchange investments will maintain or
even exceed the forecast level of net benefits throughout their
economic life. The final success of the construction component
will depend on continued growth of the Korean economy, providing
a spur to traffic growth. In the case of the TSM component the
carrying capacity of all TSM project corridors has increased
substantially. The only limitation is that the benefits may be
visible for a shorter period of time than originally anticipated
due to continued Zapid traffic growth.
8.2 Remaining issues include:
(a) continued growth of traffic into the CBD. due to the
development of satellite cities around Seoul- with
limited local employment opportunities and few
transport options.
(b) although the success of TSM is undisputed, continued
government priority on capital construction, including
roads and rail/subway, will continue to make traffic
management options less attractive.
(c) traffic accidents continue to climb. Some progress has
been made through improved signing, increased safety
facilities, imposition of more severe penalties for
violations, and improvements in driver testing.
9. BInkP.erformance
901 Bank performance was very good throughout the project
cycle. The Bank provided a continuity of involvement with a
minimum of staff changes. In addition supervision was regular
and appropriately staffed. The Bank also proved flexible with
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respect to the project, quickly incorporatintg chages as
requested by the executing agency to allow for a successful
completion of the project.
10. 1=Mffi 6ZflAQxmBn22
10.1 The Borrower and its executing/implementing agencies,
which iiicluded the Project Management and Evaluation Bureau,
Construction Management and Transportation Bureaus, Office of
Construction and Enginieering and the Traffic Police Department
which were all part of the Seoul Metropolitan Government,
performed well during the project. They eased the task of
project preparation and performed well during project
implementation.
11. a
11.1 The excellent relationship that has existed between
the staffs of the Borrower and the Bank has contributed to the
success of the project. It created good teamwork, in which each
party displayed flexibility to allow for the successful
a.hievement of the end goals. This was especially evident when
significant changes in project scope needed to be initiated.
These were accomplished with a minimum of problem and in a
timely fashion.
2. Lrol ect 1pcumentation ard -.Data
12.1 The covenants contained in the Loan Agreement were
reasonable and the Borrower complied with them. In addition, the
staff appraisal report provided a useful reference framework
during project implementation. However, with respect to post-
appraisal economic analysis, incomplete documentation either in
the files or in the SAR itself has made it very difficult to re-
assess the benefits comparatively. In the future, SARs should as
a matter of course include enough tabular information, including
cost and benefit streams and travel projections to allow for a
meaningful and comprehensive post evaluation analysis.
12.2 The Bankss documentation of the project after
appraisal has also been inadequate. There are relatively few
entries, little correspondence and minimal information in
supervision reports. In fact there are very few supervision
reports.
12.3 Finally, the project documentation and data available
bY the Borrower has also been poor. Although some information
has been kept, the government habit to destroy all "non-
essential' information related to project work, after the
rejulated five year period has left the files void of much of
the substantive data required for a comprehensive post
evaluation by the Bank.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
SEOUL RBAN TRANSPORTATION PROJECT
(Loan 2514-10)
PART XI: BORROWER'S EVALUATION
A. Conditions Leading to the Project
This project was first discussed with the government
in 1980. Rapidly increasing automobile ownership, the need to
integrate the subways with the road transport system, and the
need to better connect the satellite cities to Seoul meant that
transport was entc.ring a critical stage. The Bank's emphasis on
the necessity to address not only traffic movement issues but
also management of the system led to the inclusion of both the
civil works and TSM components. It took five years for the
government and the Bank to agree on the appropriate structure of
the project. By that time traffic in Seoul had exploded, the
needs were so great and the financing limited, that the
introduction of TSM was fully embraced.
B. Main Findinas and Lessons Learned
The following includes findings and lessons which were
identified by SMG:
(a) This was the first and only Bank urban transport
project in Seoul, but it's impact has been felt
nationwide. The introduction of TSM has allowed not
only SMG but also other urban areas to improve traffic
movement and address bottlenecks with a minimum of
financial expenditure. The results have been
noteworthy. Inchon, Pusan., Taegu and Kwangju have all
begun to implement the measures of TSM. Moreover, the
city of Seoul has identified an additional 8 areas
(Cheongryangri, Shinchon, Mokdong, the CBD, Sanggye,
Mia, Chamsil, and Chunho) in which it will introduce
the concept by 1995.
(b) Traffic growth depends on many variables including the
availability of convenient routes. As a result it is
not always predictable, as was the case with the North
Han Riverside Road. Traffic does however seek the
shortest and quickest route, as has been discovered
with the completion of the Seongsan Dong-Jungsan Dong
Road, wnich has diverted some of the CBD traffic.
C. Summary of Bank Role and PerfoAmnce
C.1 The overall success of the project can be attributed,in part, to the good performance by Bank staff during the wholeproject cycle. Supervision missions were sent to Korea on a
regular basis, and staff changes were kept to a minimum, thusenabling good relationships to be built up over the projectperiod. In addition project flexibility allowed quick responseto changes in components when it was required.
D. Evaluation of Borrower's Own Performance
D.1 The Borrower and its implementing agency performed
well during the project.
E. Remainina Issues
1.1 There are a number of issues which remain to be
resolved in Seoul. The most pertinent concerns the attempt bygovernment to change the travel patterns of those working in theCBD and requiring daily entry. With the continuing development
of satellite cities, and the continuing influx of dailytravelers from these cities to the CBD, the focus is onpersuading travelers to change from using private vehicles topublic transport.
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PROJECT COXP?LMXON RBPORT
SEOUL URBwN TRANORU!TATZON PROtnCT
(Loan 2S14-10)
PART XXIIs SThTXS?XCAL XNFONATZON
Ia3le 1: RLATE SAMI LOANS
LA rTide Purpose Approal Swus ConM.
Loan 2704-KO To incease the supply of serviced land by May 1986 Completed PCR Isued on
Utban Lad Dev. assisting Korea Land Dev. Corp. June 29. 1992
Project_ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Loan 2801-KO To improve Pusan city's urban mangemnt April 1987 Completed PCR issued on
Pusan Urban and finance by strengtenin project Dec. 18. 1991
Management selcdon and investnent planning, financial
and managerial systems and by SUppOtUlg
priority investmetts and the balanced
developments of the city.
Loan 2905-KO To increase he efficiency of mnspont in the Feb. 1988 Completed PCR issued on
Kyunggi Regional Kyunggi Region by physically improving the Dec. 30. 1992
Transpot transpoi t inftastucmre in two specifi
conidors and by supporttng the ongoing
procesS of coonlinationof tansport
invesnmnet planning in the region.
Loan 2908-KO To increase the efficiency, capacity and Feb. 1988 Ongoing
Utban Trnsport afety of the existn tuansporanon systen
(Taegu) In Taegu city through the itoduction and
application of TSM techniwques andthe
contuedon of a major urban expressway
with assoiaed links. 
__________
Loan 3061-KO To es transport capacity by supponing May 1989 Ogoing
Roase -.zovement de upgrding of the surfece and alignmnt
of exitng moads. by improving road
maintenance and opetaona by wideng
roads and increasing traffic safety. 
.
Loan 3329-KO To support he government's housing sec May 1989 ongoing
Housing Sector staegy by poviding esoutces tho the
National Housing Fund for Nadonal
Housing fund for lower-income housing and
by asisting te government informuladng a
framework for housing policy development
and an agenda for policy tefotm in the
sector. .
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SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT
Table 2: BANK RESOURCES
A. Staff lautg
aSat C=cle Num of ,ffweeks
Throuth Agmual 112.6 sw
A_m lth h fl AMMvI 58.9 w
Sunervision 35.5 w
________a__ 5.3
I TomIa 2t2;3 sw
B. MIsoos
MosJyear { No. of Days in field Spemwinoa | Pefomae antgm Type of. poblem
Preamdon
June 1980 4 I10 ECOPTPIRAICONS n.a.
Scot 1980 1 7 ECo n.a.
Oct 1991 A21 ECOC/Wr/ n.a.
Scot 1981 I 9 ECO n.a.
Jan 19S2 t 5. ECQo_ n.a.
June 1982 2 5 ECO/rE n.a.
2ec. 182a 4 13 ECcOE/UP n.a.
Mat 92/HEUP n.a.
Feb 1984 I S_ 2ECQ/UP n.a. _ __
Aggraisal 
July 198 
. 20 | /Ue n.a.
ct 1984 3 14 TE,'CONS n.a.
-De 1984 L t 1 'O n.a.
SuocrYvision 
.
.
Jan !986 4 1 FCOtJ HEC CNS t_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Nor 1986 ;2-10 . ECOtUP t
May 1987 4........... 3 UPNov M ECOMP%feb1988 7URC
Jan 1989 ..~...--.....4........ ECO 
_________ 
________
19 2 . . ECO/TE I .
Sent 1991 2 4 13 . FA/E I__
May 1992 to 1 . ECO 
_
Jan 1993 2 r5EO.
TP TmnpocPlaner ITHE Ttigbv/aY Fnuico EcOonomist Highway Engmneer
FA F u nal jA EWach AsssmUP UbanT r LO Lan Officer
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SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT
Table 3: PROJECT COST - SUMMARY
AppuAisa Fsdmaz Revised SAhtwa Alm1
____________ (USS mii) (USS mnii) (USS tnii)
Loot Sx*8 Toca LOW POMP. TOMI LOW FoToip TolaL
cms ucmI.q carn CachfAp ot abg
corC cxebm C 
Majo roads 56.5 31.9 88.4 25.6 18.0 43.0 37.5 17.4 54.9
Major _msrca 12.0 7.1 19.1 2.8 II 4.6 2.6 _i 4.1
TSM & safey worts 9.8 8.9 18.6 19.6 8. 23.9 1.01 7.5 24.S
Land aluisuzou 47.3 0 47.3 43.6 0 43.6 43.7 0 43.7
Tonicai asisanc 0.6 0.6 1.2 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.2
& uuiing _ ____ ___ ___
Sa cmon (aid 1991 126.1 48.5 174.6 91.6 26.6 120.3 100.81 26.6 127.41
cost} _ _ _ _ _ _
Physicl comu ci 7.5 5.5 13.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
price 8.6 8.4 17.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
condagrocia _ _ _ __ _ _ ______7
Tool omjmantCs 142.2 62.4 204.6 91.6 26.6 120.3 t00.81 26.6 127.4
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SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT
Tkbt 4: CUMULATE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DtSBURSEMENTS
(USS miten)
MRD Fucal Year Appaial Estmate Aca Acan as % of Apprisal.
________________ 
.,__ ...
December3l, 1985 3.1 0.0
June 30. 1986 6.9 4.0 58.0
December31. 1986 133 4.0 32.5
June 30. 1987 l92 6.5 33,,
December3l. 1987 27.7 9.1 32.9
June 30. 1988 37.6 9.8 26.1
Dmecember31. 1988 43.8 11.7 26.7
June 30. 1989 48.4 15.7 32.4
December31, 1989 51.5 19.1 37.1
June 30. 1990 53.0 19.1 36.0
December31. 1990 22.9 43.2/a
June 30. 1991 22.9 43,2 la
September 30, 1991 24.6 46.4 Li
Note: USS24,243,00 was canceite in January 1987. and die undisbuned balae of USS4.155.95 was
nceUed in Janua 993.
/a Cumdlave disbbumem as percentge of toal loan amuunt.
Daze of final disbWrsement July30. 1991
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SEOUL URBB MRPRT PROJECr
TabJhJL SrATUS OF COVENAN1S
Sec.ion Scams Oesampon Covena Coment
3.01(a) Complane The Domewer povide. as pmmpdiy as
Scdule 2 need. the finds. Acilties. services a
odUer resouce fquid for Schedule .
3.02 Compliae Goods. works and connunr serfees
Schdule 4 shall be governed by the povisionsof
Schedule 4.
4.01(a) Compliance Mainain records Vad accounts in
_ _ _ _ ac ce wit sound accfinng p .
4.01(b) Compliance povide anual adit each Septmbe. SOE
o) (a) (Iii) opuuon neded.
Schedule I Compiane Fessibility Smdy on Par 8(i) a (lii) CompleWd 1986.
pan 3 (b) before disu _
Schedule S Compliance Fumnish ank with Monitoring andPam I Quaedy Repots.
Schedule S Not Compan Completon of Wese Arterial. Part of component deleted.
pa rm 2 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Schedule 5 Not Compian Com on Easm Arterial. Past of componae deleted.
,p an S 
__ __ __ __ __ _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Schedule S CompUiance Staff up TSM Section.pats4 4_
Schedule ComPlInce TM advisors to be apponted.
pam R(a)
Schedule 5 Compliance Sabet advison tO be appobitd.
pa m ) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ 
SEOUL URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT
Tabk 6 DETAILED ROJECT COST-ACTUAL
As of December 31, 19"I
Pujeect Cna _ pmss M381 won Mtt Us$ MNI= won cut of
lAcd Fotelt Total Ouc LOt foseg Ttl Fog 8984 8985 8986 8987 1988 1989 99 1991 TOaWl CMikotaCog (5)
Majo Roam 26169 83.320 39.439 40.2 362 17 4 5 .6 32.S 453 4.833 7341 8275 S.567 8.270 4.272 3989
Fantem Atuct 1 .637 834 2.471 2.5 2.8 I 0 386 38 5 240 2.231 _ _ _ 
_ 2.471
5 sae Dh1 - s* t 5 ino " 8.61t S14 2.471 25 2 S I 1.0 3. 31.5 240 2.231 
. . . 2.47 11115/55
_ _ _ 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2122186
Westen Afteat Roa 24.S32 12.486 37.08 37 7 34 6 16.4 S80 32.2 . 283 2.602 7.341 12.753 0.562 1.270 4.272 37.013
KnaagnX.waySdn 14.Jt 7.934 22.249 22.7 200 0oo 30.0 33.3 283 2.602 7.348 tt.2l5 8ss _ 22.249 e1811851
_____ 
__ 49 _ _ _ __
Sftmngunng.ltun-fgus 80.237 4.552 t4.769 5s o 14 S 6.4 21 0 30.5 . .. 5.8 7.709 8.270 4.272 14.769 82417
-t I__I 
_ 
_I.01_
Deungad Supsctvioao 94 5 . 94S 8 0 8 . 8) 0 8 162 196 20 81S 146 805 945 
Majo tr Inttcbantt 2.810 1.240 3.50 3 4 22  .5 7 400 *| 9 2.523 38 . - - 3.
Yewp dong 2.110 1,240 3.3s0 34 2 2 8 5 3.7 400 . 509 2.523 388 -=-- 3.350 3im27I I 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0312018
et)ngo t StoPetMvlo 323 321 0 3 0.4 0.4 0 = 89 300 4 = _ 3_ -21
TSWM and Sarety Wutks 83.994 5.401 17.395 877 55s 7.4 229 32.3 . 346 328 2.070 3.132 617 4.,15 6.787 87395
TsM 8Cou,sdo,&A C8t)) 10.279 4,389 14.595 14.9 83.8 5.9 89.0 31.8 W 4 328 8.828 3.832 687 4.8 85 4.239 14.598 80186185
Safety I.785 8,082 2.797 2.8 2.4 8.5 39 38.5 . . 249 
. 2.548 2.797 03125186
Dessgn K S pestssioa 797 797 08 0.8 08 0 28 91 101 84 . 67 106 390 797
Taces ad Dutics Cvit Wosks s57 . 557 0.6 0 7 0. 7 0 . . . . . 557 557
Equi 
_ _ . 75 75 0.8 08 02 . 000 . - 27 9 29 9 I _ 7s
Taxes and Dtes Eque . ... 7.8.. 7.1 0.0t 008. 0 - 2 I 3 8 0.8 - 7.8 
Lan Acquiooon 35.026 . 35.026 35.7 4.7 - 43.7 0 8.657 8, 197 5.307 7.472 3.086 I .S60 5l?. 35t?.026
Teeikitc Assi unee & . 283 283 0.2 . 02 02 800.0 . . 200 83 
. . 213Traning 
-
-
- -
-
Base cost 77.928 20.249 98.n77 800.0 800.8 26.6 27.48 20.9 8.686 9.777 18.317 17.262 19.248 2 t.267 6.134 12.006 98.77
Physt Contitngcies . ._
Puie Continsencies 
..
.
_ 
. .
.
SOUL URBAN TRANPORT fROJKCr
T PCT ROMC UWLEMENTATION SCUEVU - ACTAL
- I
p^2ct C_F tINS I"sl 1987 198 Igo1 19510 1991!*~~~~ 12 3 4 6,,3 4 2 la 4 12 34 1 2 dl1 4 lU 2 3 4 2 4al
Weu Aaeiuh
3t_1
Y?M DMiq
Cmcd
thm
Taft Do r i: 
Go=6
SEOUL UU3AN ThANS3ORT PROIJIT
Tabk S: NIOOMIE AND EXZNDMME, tf63-91
(ugM Won
m"I 19m 2 983 1964 398Sh 3936 196? 3988 I896 3990 t991
.. .- AL A. 4aL -AoL. go.. AL 4 - . I ' )
*EVEHt4Il 492.3663.100 ZS7.27t 954.673 -940.04 13.94.30 8.S80 336.445 -81;7.81 -1.639.47 *-1. 073S.I 1.563.605 1561.756 1.716.761 L592.2s9 3.w
*lol Ta 3S4.M9S 4.391 S92.412 635.34 7M2.749 964.346 1. 88.075 1.463.70S 1251.856 1.817.322 2.160.093
"asa & hai 101.812 154.547 224.643 279.648 313.206 3501.0 392.185 440.32 438.67S 736.915 963.54
Tiagt nm 24.342 27.922 20.t45. 19.643 20.625 21.656 22.739 23.876 23.336 35.017 37.673
1 3.7n5 20.240 19.371 20.032 23.720 29.652 35.472 3$.989 2.3W _ 3,eo5 8.99
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